Abstract

HE role of judgment in interpretation has been depicted in a variety of ways in recent years. At one extreme are those who would suspend judgment from interpretation entirely, viewing it as a threat to objectivity. They would prefer simply to listen to a text. At the other extreme are those who assert that the interpreter's judgment inevitably determines the course and outcome of interpretation. It is the illusory goal of objectivity, and not the necessary prejudice of the interpreter, which must be renounced. The first extreme is naive, the second pessimistic, about the question of controlling judgment. A reader must exercise judgment continually. But there are significant differences among the kinds ofjudgment which are appropriate at different points in the interpretative process. The following pages will suggest how these judgments may and should differ in basis, function, and force. It is well for an interpreter to consider these differences, since objectivity in interpretation depends upon the deliberate and discriminating use of judgment.

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