Judging Under Political Constraint: The Ecuadorean Case (2008-2015)

Abstract

This paper offers the results of a systematical analysis of the politicization of the Ecuadorian Constitutional Court (CC) during the so-called “Citizen Revolution.” Based on empirical evidence, this paper shows the CC’s proclivity to rule in favor of political actors, the majority of whom have frequently supported presidential interests. A quantitative analysis is used to examine all 103 constitutional review cases (accion publica de inconstitucionalidad o control de constitucionalidad abstracto in Spanish) in the 2008-2015 period. The results reveal that laws are more likely to be struck down by CC justices if a policital actor claims unconstitutionality than when a non-political party claims unconstitutionality. Moreover, media coverage is also found to be a good predictor of judicial decision-making in CC cases. The findings suggest that Ecuadorean constitutional review can be politically biased, and that legislators may need to consider such bias when designing a review procedure.