Judging European Democracy

Abstract

Abstract In several EU Member States, constitutional courts have reviewed European law on its compatibility with national constitutional law. These EU-related judgments deal with issues of major importance such as the EU’s democratic legitimacy, protection of fundamental rights, division of competences between the EU and the Member States, and the status of national sovereignty within the EU. Yet, should constitutional courts decide such issues of major constitutional importance for the EU? Or is it more democratic to leave these matters to political institutions that represent Europe’s citizens and are politically accountable to them? This book argues that national constitutional courts’ review of European law frequently risks constraining and narrowing democratic debate over the EU’s constitutional underpinnings. The book challenges accounts that value national constitutional courts’ EU-related case law for helping to ensure respect for national constitutional identities, opening up a space for contestation and dialogue, or for addressing democratic problems with the EU’s decision-making process. Instead, constitutional courts risk taking sides in good faith political disagreements among elected legislators about constitutional questions relating to the EU, thus distorting, rather than protecting, the democratic decision-making process. The book uniquely combines constitutional and political theory with an in-depth case study of the German Constitutional Court, Europe’s most authoritative constitutional court. Based on an extensive study of parliamentary debates, EU policy documents and interviews with politicians, policymakers, and constitutional court judges, the case study shows how the German Constitutional Court has distorted political debate on European integration.