Joseph Raz on conceptual analysis: a critical engagement

Abstract

In this essay, I intend to engage critically with Joseph Raz’s views on the concept and the nature of law. In the second section, I present a summary of the razian argument. Then, I make two thrusts against Raz’s theses. In the third section, I will argue that from the concept of law we cannot presume anything about the nature of law, nor can we be very confident about the existence of something as a nature of law. In the fourth section, I will argue that our concept of law does not have the criterial structure Raz attributes to it, or that at least he fails to present reasons in favor of his view. This is so because he ignores the many concepts of law that we have due to the plurality of language-games we participate, and because he fails deflect what I will call the “problem of demarcation”.