Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond.

Abstract

Joseph E. Johnston and Defense of Richmond. By Steven H. Newton. Modern War Studies. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, c. 1998, Pp. xiv, 278. $29.95, ISBN 0-7006-0921-0.) Few of his contemporaries ever questioned Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston's abilities as a soldier. After Civil War, James Longstreet characterized him as the most accomplished and capable of southern generals (p. 4). Thomas J. Stonewall Jackson regarded his fellow Virginian with great respect. A number of officers who served with Johnston considered him equal of any including Robert E. Lee, in art of warfare. Yet man never has been regarded as one of war's great captains. He was forced to share credit for victory at First Manassas, and subsequently he won no great battles of his own. Lee, not Johnston, is credited with ultimate success of southern arms in Peninsula campaign. Johnston oversaw Confederate debacle at Vicksburg, and his policy of retreat to Atlanta resulted in his removal from command. Almost from beginning of war to end, he quarreled with President Jefferson Davis and other government officials over issues both trivial and important. In many respects, he resembled one of his chief opponents, George B. McClellan, who held such promise but produced so little. Steven H. Newton concedes faults attributed to Johnston, but he argues that general's performance in months prior to his near fatal wounding at Seven Pines deserves reexamination. For example, historians such as Douglas Southall Freeman, Clifford Dowdey, and Robert G. Tanner have overlooked and misinterpreted significance of early stages of campaign for Richmond in 1862 and concentrated more on emergence of Lee and dramatic Seven Days battles. As a result, he contends, scholars have not given Johnston credit that he deserves for contributing to a significant strategic victory for South and saving Confederate capital. The Rebel commander's achievement is all more remarkable considering difficult circumstances under which he worked. As Newton points out, Johnston had to contend with constant meddling from Davis and Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin. His relationship with Lee, who held title of commanding general, was complex and often confusing as it related to chain of command. More than once, Johnston received mixed messages from Lee and president, making it difficult to determine his next course of action. The army that he led had not developed a solid command structure of divisions and corps, and many of his unit commanders were incompetent. …