Joint Military Operations: Centers of Gravity and the War in Kosovo

Abstract

Abstract : The concept of centers of gravity is germane to any discussion of warfare. Despite the current glut of literature on the Revolution in Military Affairs in which many postulate the very nature of war is changing, it is wise for professional soldiers to take a deep breath and not throw the baby out with the bathwater. Even in this age of networked warfare, precision strike munitions and real time intelligence, Clausewitz's discussions of centers of gravity still provide fundamental insight into the conduct of war. This paper analyzes the conduct of Operation ALLIED FORCE, the NATO military operations in Kosovo from 24 March 1999 through 10 June 1999, from the perspective of the strategic and operational centers of gravity and develops lessons learned. The discussion begins with a short summary of the theoretical and doctrinal aspects of centers of gravity followed by a review of the ends-ways and means calculus as articulated by the principal NATO strategic level leaders. The analysis focus is in four areas: the results of the operation, political ambiguity, identifying and attacking the centers of gravity, and the effects of the enemy. The paper concludes with seven timeless lessons once again re-learned.