Abstract

In order to explore the impact of a manufacturer’s or retailer’s undertaking corporate social responsibility (CSR) and different power structures on their joint green marketing decisions and profits in the green supply chain, this paper establishes green supply chain optimization models under six different decision-making scenarios according to two different CSR bearers and three different power structures. Based on the main assumptions of a linear product demand function and CSR measured by consumer surplus, this paper solves the equilibrium solutions of the manufacturer and the retailer through game theory. The results show that: First, the difference in the degree of CSR undertaken by manufacturers and retailers leads to a difference in the ranking of optimal strategies of both parties under the three power structures. Second, under the same power structure, compared with undertaking CSR by oneself, when the other party undertakes CSR, the level of the product’s green degree, the level of green promotion, the party’s own profit, and the profit of the other party are all higher. Third, regardless of the power structure, manufacturers and retailers undertaking CSR is conducive to improving the level of product greenness, increasing green promotion, lowering the retail price, increasing consumers’ willingness to buy green products, and ultimately helping to increase the profits of manufacturers and retailers.

Highlights

  • Since there are many decision scenarios involved, in order to show more clearly and comprehensively the effects of different corporate social responsibility (CSR) bearers and different power structures on each equilibrium strategies of the manufacturer and retailer, this section first explores the effects of different power structures on each equilibrium solution under two decision scenarios, namely, CSR taken by the retailer and CSR taken by the manufacturer, and explores the effects of different CSR bearers on each equilibrium solution under three decision scenarios, namely, manufacturer-led, retailer-led, and Nash equilibrium

  • This paper established three joint green marketing decision models for green supply chains under different power structures based on the cases of retailers or manufacturers taking up CSR and focusing on consumer surplus, and explored, in turn, the influence of different power structures on the optimal decisions of green supply chain members when manufacturers or retailers take up corporate social responsibility alone

  • It explored the influence of the power structure when manufacturers or retailers take up CSR on the optimal decision-making of green supply chain members under the same power structure, and some meaningful conclusions were drawn through in-depth comparison and analysis

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Summary

Introduction

Publisher’s Note: MDPI stays neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. In the case of complex and diverse power structures, it is of great practical significance to explore the impact of corporate social responsibility on the joint green marketing strategies of green supply chain enterprises. Based on the above background, this paper takes the green supply chain as the research object, and studies the joint green marketing decision problem of the manufacturer and retailer considering different power structures and both parties’ awareness of corporate social responsibility by using the Stackelberg game method. How do different power structures affect the optimal pricing strategy, green marketing strategy, and profits of both parties when a manufacturer or retailer takes on corporate social responsibility?.

Literature Review
Problem Description and Assumptions
Decision Scenario with the Retailer Taking CSR
Manufacturer-Led Decision Scenario
Retailer-Led Decision Scenario
Nash Equilibrium Decision Scenario
Decision Scenario with the Manufacturer Taking CSR
Comparison and Analysis
CSR Taken by the Retailer
CSR Taken by the Manufacturer
Numerical Analysis
Main Conclusions
Research Limitations
Full Text
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