Joint Fire Support: How to Achieve Unity of Effort.

Abstract

Abstract : The Gulf War provided a glimpse of the possibility for the simultaneous tactical, operational and strategic paralysis of the enemy. Technology coupled with sheer numbers gave the joint force commander the ability to pursue multiple objectives simultaneously to defeat the enemy's center of gravity and accomplish the theater campaign's military objectives. The Gulf War also reinforced the fact that single services no longer conduct war without the support and or proper integration of other services. That the full potential of the U. S. led coalition was not realized is due in part to a lack of unity of effort between the Army and Air Force in the planning and execution of joint fire support. Following the Gulf War, Joint Pub 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations was published. This keystone manual introduced the concept of joint fire support. The emergence of joint fire support doctrine is directly linked to the ongoing debate between the Army and Air Force on the prosecution of the deep battle. At its heart, this disagreement represents a significantly different view of how these services see their relationship in planning and conducting joint operations in a campaign. Competition for shrinking resources, along with the Roles and Missions Commission examination of the deep battle, have heightened the disagreement between the services and distorted the issues. As a result, the debate has tended to overemphasize who conducts joint fire support at the expense of examining what the key principles are in how to plan and execute joint fire support in a theater campaign. This monograph examines the Gulf War and emerging joint and service doctrine to identify the key principles a campaign planner needs to ensure unity of effort in planning and executing joint fire support.