Abstract

In this paper, the problem of joint utility-based customized price and power control in multi-service wireless networks is addressed via S-modular theory. Each user is associated with a generic two-variable net utility function. The latter takes a different form based on the type of the requested service, and depends on both user’s uplink transmission power and the price he is willing to pay to achieve his quality of service prerequisites. The joint customized price and power control problem is formulated as a two-variable optimization problem and confronted as a non-cooperative distributed game. The S-modular theory is adopted to solve the corresponding optimization problem. The existence of the game’s Nash equilibrium point with respect to both user’s uplink transmission power and price is analytically shown, while game convergence is also proven. A distributed and iterative algorithm for computing the two-variable Nash equilibrium point is also presented. The optimal price and uplink transmission power are both determined simultaneously in a distributed manner while the control intelligence and the decision making process lie at the user. The performance of the proposed approach is evaluated via modeling and simulation and its superiority compared to other state of the art approaches is illustrated especially in terms of energy efficiency.

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