Joint Action

Abstract

Joint actions such as holding a conversation are central to human life. They implement joint intentions. These provide each party with an entitlement to the conforming actions of the other parties and corresponding obligations of conformity. Some central philosophical proposals concerning joint intentions and actions are reviewed, with special reference both to their relation to personal intentions of the participants and their capacity to explain the nature and source of the entitlements and obligations associated with joint intention and action. Some of these proposals understand joint intentions in terms of personal intentions expressible in terms of what a given individual person intends. Others do not. John Searle contends that each participant must think in terms of what ‘we’ intend. Margaret Gilbert argues that joint intentions are constituted by a joint commitment to intend as a body, where a joint commitment is not a set of personal commitments of the individual participants, but rather a commitment of them all. Given Gilbert's proposal it can be argued that entitlements and obligations of a special kind inhere in joint intentions. Others appeal to a complex moral principle to provide an explanation of the entitlements and obligations of joint intention.