John F. Kennedy and Israel

Abstract

This slender volume seeks to explicate President John F. Kennedy's policy toward Israel. Herbert M. Druks examines U.S.-Israeli diplomacy on such significant issues as economic and military aid, the status off Palestinian refugees, and Israel's nuclear weapons program. Yet the quality of this volume is so modest—especially when compared to recent books by Warren Bass, Douglas Little, and Avner Cohen—that it is difficult to recommend it to scholars or students. At first glance, Druks's volume appears promising. The author explores an important and complex diplomatic relationship during a three-year period marked by dramatic change. The front matter carries the imprimatur of Praeger Security International, a series whose advisory board features several eminent scholars of international affairs. The bibliography suggests, moreover, that Druks conducted broad research in primary sources, interview transcripts, and memoirs of the United States and Israel. Yet the core of the book is profoundly dissatisfying on several counts. First, the analysis never rises above the superficial. Druks routinely reports the statements of Kennedy and other officials without probing the deeper policy revealed by their words, grappling with the reasons behind that policy, or analyzing why it succeeded or failed. The author's most provocative claims—that Kennedy's refusal to provide a security guarantee pushed Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion both to develop nuclear weapons and ultimately to retire—are not supported with hard evidence. Finally, Druks completely ignores the impact of culture or domestic politics on the formation of U.S. policy.