John Duns Scotus on Freedom of the Will: Some Considerations

Abstract

1. John Duns Scotus (1266-1308) develops his theory on Freedom of the Will within the context of the evident phenomenon of contingency in things, and he refers its origin to God's will, manifested in the act of creation (ad extra): God is essentially free and creation is a contingent reality freely chosen by God, because if the First Efficient (God) moves necessarily, then no person would choose freely. God's freedom grounds human freedom. Therefore, correct understanding of the will and freedom within Scotistic thought requires the consideration of divine perfection and acts of choice. 2. However, the contingency he conceives here is a synchronic one, that means a state of affairs ”the contrary of which might have been at the moment it was.” It is an ”ontologico-logical structure of alternative possibilities.” This springs from the distinction of freedom into three types: the will is free in regard to opposite acts, to contrary objects and to contrary effects. In addition, making use of the Anselmian distinction of two affections: affection for advantageous and affection for justice, and of the Aristotelian distinction between rational and irrational potencies as well, Scotus comes to define the will as rational free potency, and freedom is steadfastness (firmitas), a whole-hearted commitment to and pursuit of the good, or the capacity to love a chosen object more deeply, with an intensity which deepens the commitment to that object.” It is then ”a freedom from nature” and ”a freedom for values.” 3. The ”will-contingency” structure of Scotus' theory might then offer the room for free choice of alternative possibilities, a radical indeterminism in the nature of things, a more correct understanding of physical reality, the image of a free, dynamic and creative God, and an evolutive history of humanity as well.