Johann Gottlieb Fichtes Auseinandersetzung mit der Idee einer induktiven Metaphysik im ersten Buch von Die Bestimmung des Menschen

Abstract

This paper reconstructs the first book of Fichte’s Die Bestimmung des Menschen as an implicit critique by Fichte of the idea of an inductive metaphysics, an idea that was developed explicitly by some philosophers in the German-speaking world only in the second half of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. It becomes clear which basic premises of Fichte’s philosophy are responsible for the rejection of the idea of an inductive metaphysics. In particular, the idea of an inductive metaphysics cannot be reconciled with Fichte’s strong claim of certainty. This claim was abandoned by the proponents of inductive metaphysics in the second half of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, allowing the idea of an inductive metaphysics to become a serious candidate for approaching metaphysics. The analysis of Fichte’s text also shows that it is crucial for inductive metaphysics to work out a measure of the ranking of rival explanatory hypotheses so that a rational decision between competing metaphysical theories based on inferences to the best explanation becomes possible.