Jinnah and the Muslim-majority provinces

Abstract

Although the Cripps mission had failed, it had underlined the basic contradiction in the League's demand for Pakistan. Offering provinces and not communities the right to opt out posed a potential threat to Jinnah's efforts to bring the Muslim-majority provinces under a specifically communal banner at the centre. A few of the more perceptive politicians could see that the provincial option was incompatible with following the lead of a communal party at the all-India level. It raised the awkward issue of what might happen to non-Muslim minorities in the Muslim-majority provinces if Muslim politicians in these provinces rallied behind Jinnah and the League. Here was an opportunity for the Congress to exploit the inherent weakness in Jinnah's strategy. Certainly it now became crucial for Jinnah to somehow secure the allegiance of Muslim politicians, particularly in the legislatures of the Muslim-majority provinces. At least one Congressman was aware of Jinnah's difficulties, and ready to make the most of them. Rajagopalachari urged his High Command to give the Muslim provinces the option to go their own way. This would enable the Indian union to have a strong government at the centre. In his opinion, ‘partition’ was by far the lesser evil than forcing Muslim provinces to stay in. By accepting local option, Congress at the end of the day would safeguard its power at the centre and in all probability the League would be tossed into oblivion.