Jews and the Conservative Rift (review)

Abstract

American conservatism was enveloped in a mood of doubt and angst during the 1980s and 1990s precisely at the time when its message had seemingly never resonated more strongly. These two decades saw a worldwide movement liberating markets from governmental restrictions, even among countries identifying themselves as socialist; the dissolution of the Soviet empire and the end of the Cold War; and widespread disillusionment with the Great Society reforms of the 1960s. During these years, however, conservative thinkers were increasingly somber rather than exultant. Part of the reason for this gloom was a long, bitter, and multifaceted struggle within the conservative camp over the meaning of conservatism and the identity of the rightful heirs of the conservative legacy. At times it seemed that conservatives believed their most notable enemies to be fellow conservatives. Despite the widely held perception that Jews, and particularly Jewish intellectuals, were people of the Left, Jews played an important role in this conflict. One of the most important of the recent intraconservative rumbles has been between two small but influential groups of conservative intellectuals--the traditionalists, or "paleoconservatives" as they frequently were called, and the "neoconservatives." While there were few Jews among the paleos, Jews comprised a majority of the most significant neoconservative thinkers, and Jews edited Commentary and Public Interest, the two most important neoconservative magazines. No group of conservative thinkers "had ever come close to carrying as sizable a Jewish imprint as the neoconservatives," wrote Seth Forman, a young historian. For the first time in American history, "an identifiable group of well placed and influential Jewish thinkers had exhibited a willingness to reorder the priorities of American Jews and to suggest in the strongest terms that Jewish well-being might not necessarily be tied to . . . progressive social and political forces of any kind." The rift between the paleoconservatives and the neoconservatives cannot be fully explained without considering the Jewish dimension of neoconservatism. Although it appeared to outsiders to be a tempest in a teapot, this rift is an important chapter in the history of recent American conservatism in general and the American Jewish conservative intelligentsia in particular. 1 [End Page 195] The hostility between the paleocons and neocons, which went back as far as the 1970s, was intensified in 1980 when the election of Ronald Reagan raised the stakes in the struggle over the conservative patrimony. A conservative government was now in power in Washington, headed by a man who thought of himself as a conservative and was interested in conservative ideas; conservative think-tanks were anxious to provide employment for right-thinking intellectuals; and conservative foundations, awash in cash, were eager to assist in this new era of conservative governance. The neoconservative and traditionalist rivalry, which had largely involved policy differences, now also became a struggle over political and academic appointments, grants from the major conservative foundations, and other emoluments. In this more hospitable environment for conservatives, the question as to what conservatism was all about and who were the true keepers of the conservative flame became more important. Another factor in intensifying the paleocon-neocon rivalry was the collapse of communism in Europe. The fear of communism had been the single most important element unifying the notoriously fractious conservative movement. With the lifting of the Iron Curtain in Europe in 1989 and with the end of communism in Russia in 1991, conservative ideologues now had the luxury of focusing their attention on the supposed heretics within conservative ranks. And as foreign policy became less prominent on the conservative agenda, the social and cultural issues which had divided the neconservatives and the traditionalists became more important. For some paleoconservatives, their union with the neoconservatives had always been a marriage of convenience. Now it was time for a divorce. In 1966 Jeffrey Hart, a traditionalist conservative, had anticipated and welcomed the emergence of neoconservatism. Hart, a professor of literature at Dartmouth College, predicted in The American Dissent, published during the heyday of the New Left and the counterculture, that...