JCPOA revival: A game theoretical approach

Abstract

This article employs game theory to analyze the potential revitalization of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the factors that influence the decision-making processes of Iran and the United States. The JCPOA, an agreement signed in 2015, placed significant restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program in return for the lifting of economic sanctions. However, the situation shifted dramatically when the United States withdrew from the agreement in 2018. Despite recent negotiations and renewed hopes for a revival of the JCPOA, events such as the inauguration of Iran’s conservative president and ongoing conflict in Ukraine have resulted in a stalemate. This article explores the policy options available to each party and assesses their associated risks and benefits. By applying game theory, it offers a more precise understanding of the strategies employed by both actors and the potential future of the JCPOA. The analysis ultimately concludes that it is highly improbable that the JCPOA will be revived in the near future. Sanctions are likely to remain in place while Iran continues to maintain ambiguity regarding its nuclear program. A major transformation would be required to fundamentally alter the current situation.