Japan's Policy toward the Kampuchean Question

Abstract

The Kampuchean question has been an important element in Japan's Southeast Asian policy since 1978. Vietnam's military intervention in Kampuchea in November 1978 occurred at a time when Japan's perceptions of and relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union were undergoing major changes. The signing of a peace treaty with the PRC in August 1978 had indicated Japan's priorities in relations with its two powerful Communist neighbors. The growing Soviet military buildup in and around Japan, coupled with Moscow's intervention in Afghanistan, further hardened Tokyo's attitude, and by 1980 it virtually discarded its earlier multi-directional approach to foreign policy. The hardening of Japan's foreign policy was also reflected in its vigorous support of the ASEAN group on the Kampuchean question. Since 1979 Japan's relations with Vietnam have been virtually nonexistent. Indochina has been a low priority area in Japan's Southeast Asia policy since 1952. When, in 1959, Japan normalized relations with South Vietnam, it did so under considerable political compulsions. But this did not preclude Japan from forging at least nominal economic links with North Vietnam. During the Vietnam War, Tokyo's support of the U.S. intervention aroused a serious political controversy in Japan, and in order to avoid further diplomatic embarrassment, it promptly recognized the unified Vietnam in 1975. Later, in 1977, the Fukuda doctrine clarified that close relations with the ASEAN countries would not be inconsistent with fostering mutual understandings with Vietnam and the other Indochinese countries. ' Economic relations between Japan and Vietnam started to develop,