Japanese encephalitis virus: epidemiology and risk-based surveillance approaches for New Zealand

Abstract

ABSTRACT The introduction and subsequent rapid spread of Japanese encephalitis virus genotype IV across all Australian mainland states and the Northern Territory since late 2021 has increased the risk of an incursion of this mosquito-transmitted zoonotic virus disease into New Zealand, with serious implications for both animal and human health. The potential modes of entry are through introduction of infected mosquitoes as hitchhikers on ships or aircraft, windborne transfer of mosquitoes, or arrival of infected reservoir bird species. A competent vector mosquito, Culex quinquefasciatus, is endemic in New Zealand and other mosquito species may also become involved. If infection becomes established in New Zealand, the scale of transmission may be considerably less than has occurred in Australia because climatic and epidemiological factors are not so favourable. Early evidence of an incursion could come from detection of clinical disease in horses or pigs, or from human cases. Targeted surveillance to confirm or refute indications of an incursion could be undertaken by antibody detection in a number of species. Dogs have been shown to be a particularly valuable sentinel species due to their cohabitation with people and high seroconversion rate. Other novel methods of surveillance could include reverse transcriptase PCR (RT–PCR) on oronasal secretions of pigs. Should evidence of the disease be detected, prompt action would be required to vaccinate at-risk human populations and clarify the epidemiological situation with respect to mammalian hosts and mosquito vector species, including whether a new mosquito species had arrived in the country. Abbreviations: AHL: Animal Health Laboratory; JE: Japanese encephalitis disease; JEV: Japanese encephalitis virus; RT–PCR: Reverse transcriptase PCR