Abstract

This chapter focuses on the case of Japan, and its electoral reform, analyzing both the current mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system and its former single nontransferable vote (SNTV) system. The chapter tests for impacts of electoral system change in the Liberal Democratic Party’s assignment of members to committees in the House of Representative of the Diet. It finds that the some aspects of the expertise model apply more strongly under MMM than under SNTV, but that the party follows the logic of the electoral–constituency model more than the expertise model, even under MMM. Both findings conform to theoretical expectations. The chapter also analyzes the main alternative parties in each electoral system era: the Japan Socialist Party (under SNTV) and the Democratic Party of Japan (under MMM). For these two left-leaning parties, we find considerable evidence that a party’s issue ownership matters to party personnel practices.

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