Abstract

Japan's strategic thinking has been driven by three main factors: a fear of isolation, calculation of the geopolitical strength of China (and to a lesser extent, Korea), and accommodation to the prevailing international power structure. During the Cold War Japan aligned with Washington, but maintained sufficient distance to explore a mutually beneficial relationship with China based on Japan's dominant economic position. As Chinese power has grown and Japan's own economic tools for statecraft have slowed, Tokyo has moved closer to the United States to balance Chinese power. Japan has also had to seek new ways to shape the security environment in Asia, turning to multilateral diplomacy such as the Changmai Initiative. Where Japan's diplomacy in Asia in the 1980s and 1990s emphasized Japan's unique ability to champion “Asian” values with the West, increasingly Tokyo has emphasized its unique ability to champion universal values of democracy and rule of law in Asia. This theme has been used by conservative governments to improve Japan's brand over China, but also builds on a tradition of Japanese diplomatic efforts to take a lead in rule‐making in the region. Prime Minister Koizumi's assertive foreign policy helped to reinvigorate Japan's international position, but he moved from the traditional three part formulation of Japan's orientation – the U.S. alliance, the UN system and Asia – to a simpler two part formulation of “the U.S.‐Japan alliance and international cooperation.” The lack of focus on Asia has contributed to growing tensions with South Korea and China over history issues, even as Japan's global and broader regional standing has increased according to most opinion polls. These regional challenges will continue to confront future Prime Ministers well past Koizumi.

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call