Japan's Security Bills in the Relations with Korea

Abstract

This paper explores the interconnectedness of Japan’s constitutional reinterpretation and revised security bills with Korea’s security, and attempts to pave the way forward a cooperative security network, while reconsidering “intergovernmental needdriven pragmatism” as a useful framework. Both Korea and Japan share a security interest in the face of North Korea’s threat and specifically, Japan considers China’s proliferating FTA networks as threatening to its survival as seen in the Abe’s statement. Their security interests are likely to create a common need transcending wartime legacies. In putting the need in motion forward a cooperative security network, a few prerequisites need to be reconsidered. A few unclear and contradictory points embedded in the bills should be clarified largely through intergovernmental consultation. Korea’s public sentiment would not allow to deal with the security agendas between the two countries. The U.S.-Korea-Japan tripartite meeting can be conceived as a way to ameliorate Korea’s anti Japan sentiment and to draw out Japan’s support for Korea in times of contingencies. In common, the two publics consider Korea-U.S. and Japan-U.S. alliances as a way to guarantee their security. The meeting would bring Korea a considerable benefit including its stronger counter over North Korea’s threats. With intergovernmental consultation, Abe’s more efforts to remove wartime legacies and an unreliable Japan’s image from a Korean perspective would promote a cooperative security network.