Abstract

JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY has entered a new phase, reflecting changes within the international system which have altered the predominant assumptions upon which that policy had traditionally been formulated in the post-war years. From 1945 to 1975, the leaders of Japan had been able to rely on the primacy of American military power at the global level and a striking number of shared interests between themselves and successive United States' administrations. Certain corollaries of this perceived reality created a world in which Japanese foreign policy operated without major constraints: (1) the strategic protection by the United States' nuclear force made a sufficient self-defense capability unnecessary; (2) the availability of raw materials and export markets, combined with the relatively unimpeded international exchange of goods and capital safeguarded by the Bretton Woods system, provided Japan with a stable international economic framework within which to reorder and reconstruct its economy; and (3) the maintenance of a fair degree of domestic political concensus regarding foreign policy was facilitated by unified perceptions of the international system and the continued dominance of a single political party. By the mid-1970s, however, this overriding assumption and its corollaries had been overshadowed by developments at several levels, causing the leaders of Japan to re-evaluate objectively the protection previously assumed from repeated American defense pledges. The results of that re-evaluation were initiatives which have put Japan squarely on the road toward gradual rearmament. Prime Minister Ohira has inherited a legacy of a stronger military policy than seemed conceivable at the beginning of this decade. Perhaps the greatest single choice before his government is the question of how far to proceed down the road followed by his predecessor. Early in 1978, then-Prime Minister Fukuda expressed deep concern for the security of his nation, using his opening statement to the Diet to call for a full review of military and security issues. Japanese

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