JAPAN AND THE EAST ASIAN BALANCE OF POWER

Abstract

Abstract : As of now, 13 years after the collapse of the American enterprise in Vietnam, dangers to the East Asian balance of power seem remote, despite growing Soviet military power and increased political interest in the area. However, the relations of the United States and Japan are pivotal to sustaining the current balance of power in the region. What could damage U.S. interests in the area is a change in Japan's role. No one expects Japan to become hostile, but, substitute the words indifferent, neutral, non-aligned, or aloof, and the relationship is changed ominously. What factors might change the Japanese-American relationship? First would be an attempt to revise the current formal treaty status to expand the scope of Japanese military obligations in East Asia and to relate these to contingencies in the Middle East or Europe. The second danger is clearly trade and finance. As the U.S. defense establishment warns, a trade war with Japan would endanger higher political and military interests. The third lever that might move Japan is defense expenditures. No one argues that Japan should not be able to defend itself to the extent of making a would-be aggressor at least calculate his probable losses. But continuing attempts to co-opt a greatly augmented Japanese force into American operational plans risk alienation of the Japanese public and Japan's neighbors. Arguments that the Seventh Fleet is doing Japan's job in the Indian Ocean break down on the assumption that Japan sees a job that needs doing; it doesn't. Fourth, there is a remote danger that the United States might eventually seek a special relationship with the People's Republic of China as a substitute for the Japanese one. If the balance of power in East Asia were to begin to turn against U.S. interests, there would be opportunities for the Soviets. But the argument here is that this balance is now at risk only if the United States mishandles its relations with Japan.