James Madison's Theory of the Self-Destructive Features of Republican Government

Abstract

T HE purpose of this article is to examine afresh and critically one highly important aspect of James Madison's contribution to republican political theory-his diagnosis of and recommended cure for faction, the omnipresent and sometimes mortal disease of republican government. Such a contribution, to be rightly understood, must be viewed in the context of Madison's broader achievement: his adaptation of a traditional republican theory to the problem of establishing and maintaining republican government in a federal state; or, phrasing it differently, his creative quest for a more nearly perfect union, reconciling liberty and authority, balancing center and circumference, and curbing not only the selfish friends but also the scheming foes of republicanism. However, prior to such an examination, it is extremely important to stress (as I have done in more detail elsewhere') Madison's orthodox republican philosophy which constitutes Madison's theoretical orientation; and to identify those over-all problems which confronted Madison in his efforts to establish and maintain republican government in America. Only in this way can Madison's theory with regard to faction be placed in proper perspective. We must certainly always be on guard against reading our own political values into Madison's writings. We must also beware of the danger of generalizing from select passages in Madison's writings, in the various periods of his political career, in order to demonstrate his republican orientation and his role as Republican Savior. Yet, on balance, one must, I believe, affirm unequivocally Madison's dominant republican orientation and his leading role in rescuing republicanism in America. Madison firmly believed in popular, representative, responsible, limited government, utilizing the principles of majority rule, short elective terms, and rotation in office. Once this point is clearly established, one can examine his theory of the self-destructive features of republican government without being misled by his more pessimistic appraisal of human nature, his devotion to property and order, and his fear of majority faction. Four interrelated problems challenged Madison: first, the self-destructive features of republican government itself, either at the state level or in the government of the Union; second, the potent forces of disunion; third, the potentially dangerous antior pseudo-republicans; and fourth, the huge geographic size of American which discouraged the advocates of a more nearly perfect republican union and encouraged both the centripetal forces of confederation and the centrifugal forces of consolidation. Although in dealing with these four problems one must pay close attention to Madison's most creative period-that centering around the waiting and adoption of the Constitution-a full and just estimate of Madison's theory must take