Abstract
This paper examines James Buchanan's normative theory of the state and in particular his attempt to establish a legitimating linkage between the individual and the state. It begins by outlining Buchanan's consent‐based theory of the state and the distinction he draws between the explanatory and justificatory roles of his theory. It proceeds to examine the role of his conceptual contract as a justificatory argument for existing and proposed political institutions. It finds that while the conceptual contract may provide an account of the contingent rationality of the state, it fails to have normative significance in terms of Buchanan's value individualism and subjectivism. Buchanan has also failed to address some of the problems associated with securing and enforcing contractual agreement. These conclusions point to wider problems with rational choice theories of the emergence of the state.
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