James and Bradley: American truth and British reality

Abstract

William James (1842-1910) and Francis Herbert Bradley (1846-1924) were acknowledged as leading American and British philosophers of their day. They never met, but corresponded, and commented upon each other's work. Although they are among most influential and important philosophers of past century, their major claims and arguments are often badly misunderstood and misinterpreted by philosophers. This comparative study aims to clarify their main claims and arguments, and to show that, while James' pragmatism and Bradley's monistic idealism are usually viewed as opposite extremes, their positions, in fact, display an intriguing mixture of affinities and contrasts, and are often derived from surprisingly similar premisses. They were also insightful critics of each other's work, James describing Bradley as the bogey and bugbear of most of his beliefs. Professor Sprigge examines and evaluates views of each thinker on a large number of issues, including: nature of truth; logic of relations; personal identity; place of consciousness in world; monism and pluralism; God and Absolute; and experience and reality of time.