Jacques Derrida and Chuang Tzu: Some Analogies in Their Deconstructionist Discourse on Language and Truth

Abstract

Taoism as a classical Chinese philosophy is well-known in the West, although it might still be new to compare Taoism and deconstruction. Philosophers such as Hegel, Jung, and Heidegger have discussed Taoism in their works. For instance, Hegel says in one of his lectures: “Ohne Namen ist Tao das Prinzip des Himmels und der Erde; mit dcm Namen ist es die Mutter des Universums” (146). Jung wrote, “If we take Tao as the method or conscious way by which to unite what is separated, we have probably come quite close to the psychological content of the concept” and he acknowledged that in his technique he “had been unconsciously led along the secret way which for centuries has been the preoccupation of the best mind of [China]” (quoted in Chang 5). Heidegger wrote: “Das Leitwort im dichtenden Denken des Laotse lautet Tao und bedeutet “eigentlich” Weg. Weil man jedoch den Weg leicht nur auserlich vorstellt als die Verbindungsstrecke zwischen zwei Orten, had man in der Ubereilung unser Wort “Weg” fur ungeeignet befunden, das zu nennen, was Tao sagt. Man ubersetzt Tao deshalb durch Vernunft, Geist, Raison, Sinn, Logos” (Heidegger, qtd. in Walf 5). Jacques Derrida’s theory and practice of deconstruction is built on assumptions which – as it will be argued in this article – can be found in Taoist philosophy. This notion can be exemplified with the opening statement of The Tao Te Ching:This statement raises three fundamental issues. The first has to do with the concept of Truth. According to Lao Zi (Lao Tzu), the essence of Tao – similar to the Western ideas of God, Origin, Meaning, and Derrida’s “transcendental signified” – can hardly be defined or captured. Another issue concerns the arbitrariness and instability of language. The name that we use for Tao is nothing but a name; it can be changed; other words may serve to name it just as well. Still another relates to the status of the subject: whoever names the Tao does so from a necessarily subjective and temporary position; she/he is forever denied access to the objective, everlasting Tao. The above assertion was initially made by Lao Zi (571 B.C.), but it is Chuang Tzu, (also Zhuang Zi, 369–275 B.C.), the second master of Taoism, who carries the torch of scepticism and discusses at much greater length the problems of language and truth. Based on these considerations, an inquiry into the writings of Derrida and Chuang Tzu will reveal that these two philosophers maintain many similar assumptions. Fully aware of language working against itself, the Chinese and the French thinkers take for their point of departure a highly sceptical stance towards all claims to truth. And both enjoy the textual free play which defies common-sense uses of language. Sceptical of man’s efforts to discover Truth, Chuang Tzu argues that all discourses on Truth are movements of one biased system replacing another. Taking some cues from the first master, Chuang Tzu employs every resource of rhetoric to debunk the conventional propositions and values of his time. Perhaps the most vigorous force of Chuang Tzu’s writing lies in the way it undermines the stability of language. He not only thinks that language is inadequate to describe the true Tao, but he deliberately uses words to mean the opposite of what they ordinarily mean, in order to reveal their self-contradictions. His chief device of rhetoric is paradox, which compels the reader to realize that “awareness of a truth outside the pale of ordinary logic,” reduces “language to a gibbering inanity” (Watson 5).