Abstract
This chapter deals with the suppressed premisses of David Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. If there is anything about this argument of Hume which is more admirable than its content, it is the explicitness of it. For the conclusion (j), then, Hume's argument has just three premisses: the two premisses he states, (e) and (f), and the unstated one just mentioned. The whole proposition stated reduces to this: that all predictive-inductive inferences are invalid, and that all the inferences, which result from supplementing the premisses of a predictive-inductive inference by further observational premisses, are also invalid. The essence of Hume's argument is explained. Hume's argument in stage 2 may be summed up in the following way: from premisses which prove at most the invalidity of predictive-inductive inferences, along with the unstated premiss that an inference is unreasonable if it is invalid, Hume concluded that predictive-inductive inferences are unreasonable.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
