Abstract
Abstract In this article, we analyse to what extent the change in the Danish fishery policy from an effort restriction based management system (ERIQ) to a system based on individual transferable quotas (ITQ) has improved the creation of resource rent. Fisheries economic theory shows that ITQ-based fisheries in a perfect world will be efficient and resource rents will be larger than in fisheries regulated by various forms of entry restrictions and effort regulations. The results presented in this article and evidence from the entire Danish fishery support this conclusion. However, the analyses also show that the resource rent in an ITQ-based fishery might not differ very much from the resource rent in a well-managed fishery based on effort restrictions. JEL Classification Codes: Q22, Q28
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