Abstract
The Internet has enabled the emergence of collective problem solving, also known as crowdsourcing, as a viable option for solving complex tasks. However, the openness of crowdsourcing presents a challenge because solutions obtained by it can be sabotaged, stolen, and manipulated at a low cost for the attacker. We extend a previously proposed crowdsourcing dilemma game to an iterated game to address this question. We enumerate pure evolutionarily stable strategies within the class of so-called reactive strategies, i.e., those depending on the last action of the opponent. Among the 4096 possible reactive strategies, we find 16 strategies each of which is stable in some parameter regions. Repeated encounters of the players can improve social welfare when the damage inflicted by an attack and the cost of attack are both small. Under the current framework, repeated interactions do not really ameliorate the crowdsourcing dilemma in a majority of the parameter space.
Highlights
The Internet has enabled the emergence of collective problem solving, known as crowdsourcing, as a viable option for solving complex tasks
Among the 4096 possible reactive strategies, we find 16 strategies each of which is stable in some parameter regions
The in-house solution selected by both agents is the unique equilibrium when the damage inflicted by an attack is high and the cost of attack is low
Summary
The Internet has enabled the emergence of collective problem solving, known as crowdsourcing, as a viable option for solving complex tasks. A silver bullet to secure crowdsourcing for all possible attacks may be difficult to find Services such as Amazon’s Mechanical Turk will likely diminish the problem of intentional attacks by using a reputation system, discouraging participants to sabotage[12]. Other approaches such as error correction have been shown to be effective in crowdsourcing settings. Crowdsourcing by both agents is the unique equilibrium when the damage inflicted by an attack is low. The in-house solution (i.e., not crowdsourcing) selected by both agents is the unique equilibrium when the damage inflicted by an attack is high and the cost of attack is low. Mutual cooperation emerges in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma under appropriate conditions if players adopt conditional strategies such as variants of Tit-for-Tat (i.e., do what the opponent did in the last round)[20,21,22,23,24,25]
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
