Abstract
In the Edgeworth non-tatonnement process, trade occurs if there exists some coalition of agents able to make a Pareto-improving trade among themselves at current prices. It is known that the coalition size required is bounded by the number of commodities and that, provided all agents always have strictly positive endowments, bilateral trade suffices. These results are generalized, but it is shown that, when some agents do not hold all commodities, the information requirements for coalition formation can be very severe. Coalition size is not the only problem; very detailed information on preferences may be needed.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
