Abstract

Summary Dominant party systems trigger controversy about how the EU should engage with them. The examples of Ethiopia and Rwanda show that the willingness of authoritarian governments to engage with the EU on democratic reforms varies widely. The paper argues that the type of challenge to regime survival that authoritarian governments face affects both their coercive strategies and their openness to engaging with the EU, giving the EU different entry points to support reforms. Yet, due to EU domestic factors and difficulties with ‘reading’ authoritarian regimes’ logic of political survival, the EU has problems making use of this dynamic.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.