It's Difficult to Explain Away the Appearance That Causation Comes in Degrees: A Reply to Sartorio

Abstract

ABSTRACTDoes the relation of (actual) causation admit of degrees? Is it sensible to say, for example, that ‘as compared to his consuming the light beer, Clement's consuming the moonshine was more a cause of his becoming drunk’? Suppose the answer is ‘yes’. Suppose also that country A unjustifiably ignites a lethal war with country B, and you intuit that, while most combatants of A are liable to lethal counterattack, most non‐combatants of A aren't similarly liable. Then, you might support your intuition by reasoning as follows. ‘Perhaps most non‐combatants of A causally contribute to A's unjust, lethal war effort. However, unlike most combatants of A, their causal contributions are not of such a degree that makes them liable to lethal counterattack’. Such reasoning is rejected by Carolina Sartorio. This is due to the recent revealing of a certain puzzle, one which suggests to Sartorio that causation does not come in degrees. Now, one motivation for Sartorio's reaction to the aforementioned puzzle is her thought that we can, for the most part, ‘explain away’ the ‘illusion’ that causation comes in degrees. I will argue that Sartorio insufficiently supports her foregoing thought. Using Sartorio's resources, we cannot (largely) ‘explain away’ the widespread appearance that causation comes in degrees.