IT Impacts and the DPRK

Abstract

This paper seeks to examine the relationship between information technologies (ITs) on the transnational affairs of North Korea. The recent unrests in Northern Africa and the Middle East have demonstrated the crucial role of communication technology and social networking in prompting regime changes. It has been historically clear too that power can shift and dictators can be ousted if there is enough enthusiasm among the common citizenry. Obviously, technology and increases in information flow can speed up social mobilization if there is a strong enough ideology and willingness among people. This paper would first examine the level of new information and communication technologies of the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, North Korea), using a case study approach. Although the Internet is tightly controlled, there are now hundreds of thousands of legal (Koryolink) and black market cell phones in North Korea, despite the initial 2003 ban. Second, this paper seeks to analyze the impacts of these new technologies on transnational affairs of North Korea. South Korea has invested so much time and effort into financial and food aid on the basis of placation and humanitarian aid, but it has proven primarily to be an enabling force to the Kim regime and has facilitated the development of nuclear weapons. Perhaps with current containment policies, innovative engagement strategies can be sought out to increase technological integration to the public as a bargaining chip within a larger package. Even if the DPRK government understands the implications, they can hardly argue against the international community offering something which they themselves charge the public for. Perhaps food and phones will prove to do more for fostering a change in DPRK behavior than six party talks or other attempts. As such, the conclusion is that along with the proponents of North Korean collapse, or regime change, there is a need for support to increase information technology penetration in the North.