Issues affecting advanced passive light-water reactor safety analysis

Abstract

Next generation commercial reactor designs emphasize enhanced safety by means of improved safety system reliability and performance. These objectives are achieved via safety system simplification and reliance on immutable natural forces for system operation. Simulating the performance of these safety systems will be central to analytical safety evaluation of advanced passive reactor designs. Yet, the characteristically small driving forces of these safety systems pose challenging computational problems to current thermal-hydraulic systems analysis codes. Additionally, the safety systems generally interact closely with one another, requiring accurate, integrated simulation of the nuclear steam supply system, engineered safeguards and containment. Furthermore, numerical safety analysis of these advanced passive reactor designs will necessitate simulation of long-duration, slowly-developing transients compared with current reactor designs. The composite effects of small computational inaccuracies on induced system interactions and perturbations over long periods may well lead to predicted results which are significantly different than would otherwise be expected or might actually occur. Comparisons between the engineered safety features of competing U.S. advanced light water reactor designs and analogous present day reactor designs are examined relative to the adequacy of existing thermal-hydraulic safety codes in predicting the mechanisms of passive safety. Areas where existing codes may require modification, extension or assessment relative to passive safety designs are identified. Conclusions concerning the applicability of these codes to advanced passive light water reactor safety analysis are presented.