Israelis versus Palestinians

Abstract

Michael Brecher is R.B. Angus Professor of Political Science at McGill University and Director of the International Crisis Behaviour Project. He has written several books on the Arab-Israel conflict, including the prize-winning The Foreign Policy System of Israel. Irving Brecher is Emeritus Professor of Economics at McGill University. He was a member of the first Board of Directors of the Montreal-based International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development. Among his publications is Human Rights, Development and Foreign Policy: Canadian Perspectives. To everything there is a season, And a time to every purpose under the heaven:... A time to kili, and a time to heal;... A time to [hate], and a time to [love]; A time for war, and a time for peace. Ecclesiastes 3:1INTIFADA II IN CONTEXTIt is easy to despair at the turn of events the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has taken since late September 2000: persistent violence; wanton killing and maiming by both sides, mostly of civilians - men and women, children and the elderly; escalating anger and hostility; and an increasingly rigid mindset on the part of leaders on both sides, which makes compromise and concessions even more difficult than usual. The most tragic and disquieting result of Intifada II is the shattering of trust - a fragile, carefully nurtured, intangible gift of the Oslo agreement of September 1993.On the Israeli side, the peace camp has been decimated; and the mood of disappointment after Yassir Arafat rejected the most farreaching Israeli offer of terms for a 'final status' agreement - Ehud Barak at Camp David in July 2000, enriched at the follow-up talks in Taba, Egypt, in January 2001 - has been captured by the near-universal lament among Israelis: 'We do not have a partner for peace.'(1) Moreover, a widespread feeling of personal insecurity descended upon Israel, despite its vast military superiority over the lightly armed Palestinian police, security forces, and militias. Thus, Israelis of all political persuasions have rallied behind Ariel Sharon, one of Israel's most controversial military and political leaders. Less than a year earlier, he had been considered unelectable as prime minister after a formal Israeli commission of inquiry found him 'indirectly responsible' for the 1982 massacre of Palestinians by Christian militia forces in the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila in Lebanon.On the Palestinian side, scepticism about the ultimate fruits of the Oslo agreement gradually gave way to mass frustration on three fronts. First was the slow pace of the transfer of territory to the Palestinian Authority (PA) - Prime Ministers Benjamin Necanyahu and Barak had both refused to implement the third phase of with-drawal by Israeli forces, a formal commitment undertaken by Israel in the United States-brokered Wye agreement of October 1997. Secondly, the primary goal of an independent state seemed even more remote with the perpetuation of Israel's occupation of most of the West Bank and a considerable part of the Gaza Strip, the latter never considered a part of the historic Land of Israel. Finally, there was no visible material improvement in daily life. Indeed, the situation had worsened, especially during periods of 'closure' following a suicide bombing or some other act of terror committed by Palestinian foes of any accommodation with Israel - Hamas and Islamic Jihad. At such times more than 100,000 Palestinians whose livelihood depends on employment in Israel are prevented from entering the twice-'Promised Land' (by the British, to the Palestinians in 1915 and to the Jews in 1917). All that Arafat needed as a pretext to launch a new Intifada was a highly visible provocation by 'the enemy.' Sharon, then leader of the Likud opposition, duly provided it with his demonstrative visit in September 2000 to the Temple Mount/Haram-al-Sharif, the holiest shrine for Jews worldwide and a holy place for Muslims. …