Israeli-Jordanian dialogue, 1948-1953: cooperation, conspiracy, or collusion?

Abstract

Israeli-Jordanian Dialogue, 1948-1953: Cooperation, Conspiracy, or Collusion? by Yoav Gelber. Brighton, UK and Portland, OR: Sussex Academic Press, 2004. ix + 294 pages. Notes to p. 346. Bibl. and sources to p. 349. $75. The relationship between Hashimite rulers of Jordan and Zionist leaders of Yishuv, and then Israel, offers a fascinating case of possibilities and limitations of private dialogues among public enemies. Too often, attempts to explore this nuanced and difficult relationship have been sidetracked by polemic, whether over existence of collusion between 'Abdullah of Transjordan and his Jewish counterparts during period leading up to establishment of Israel in 1948 or in more recent times. Yoav Gelber's new book explores Israeli-Jordanian relations during and after 1948 war, in often-neglected period after Israel came into being but before rise of Jamal 'Abd al Nasir's contentious panArabism. While book occasionally falls back into tired polemics over wealth of detail on post-1948 dialogues between (Trans) Jordan and Israel offers a real contribution to history of region. Gelber's polemic against New Historians, which he presents as central to his project, is weakest part of book. Gelber is particularly exercised by Avi Shlaim's claims about an explicit agreement between Abdullah and Jewish leadership over future of Palestine. Gelber claims that the documentary evidence on contacts between Israel and Jordan in 1948 and after simply refutes Shlaim's surmises and conclusions (p. 4). The voluminous evidence in book does not allow so conclusive a verdict, however. Evidence of internal disagreements among Israeli leadership about relations with 'Abdullah does not prove, as Gelber suggests, that an agreement did not exist at diplomatic level. His account of first four days of fighting, in which Arab Legion and Israeli forces did not come into conflict, suggests that some prior understanding may well have been in effect, at least until agreement broke down over Jerusalem (pp. 11-12). His chief piece of evidence that contrary to contemporary and later allegations of collusion, in Jewish eyes Legion was primary enemy (p. 20) is remarks made by David Ben Gurion on June 18, well after conflict in Jerusalem would have invalidated an agreement had it existed. In other words, evidence remains frustratingly inconclusive. That Gelber's exhaustive search for decisive evidence failed to produce a smoking gun suggests that one may never be found. Far stronger than polemic is Gelber's meticulous tracing of Jordanian-Israeli contacts over a turbulent and uncertain period. …