Abstract
Following the establishment of an apparently successful peacekeeping operation (PKO) in South Lebanon after the July 2006 war, the idea of deploying a similar operation in the Israeli–Palestinian was raised by European leaders and the Palestinian Authority. Israel was quick to reject this proposal. However, the June 2007 Hamas seizure of power in the Gaza Strip has softened this stance, with Israel reappraising the issue. Based on experience with the two peacekeeping forces (UNDOF and UNIFIL), the article assesses the potential impact of a Palestine-oriented PKO for Israel. The article defines the most relevant operational functions for such a PKO, specifically: to make defection difficult, to increase confidence in the arrangement, and to serve as a conduit for communication between the sides. The article then reviews recent precedents for success, explaining why UNDOF succeeded in fulfilling expectations, whereas UNIFIL has not. By exploring the reasons for Israel's opposition to another PKO, the article elaborates on the salience of the parties' ability to suppress violence. A key factor in Israel's decision should be whether Palestinian entities (in Gaza or the West Bank) have the capacity to control violence or will apply it. In its absence, Israel's troubled experience with UNIFIL should serve as the relevant guide.
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