Abstract
Siguiendo el enfoque enactivo aplicado por Popova (2015) a la narrativa, esta investigación se centra en dos grupos de metáforas en torno a las cuales Heródoto organizó sus percepciones sobre isonomia y demokratia: el cognitivo y el pragmático. En lugar de destacar las diferencias entre isonomia y demokratia, deseamos evidenciar interacciones acumulativas entre ambos conceptos, un proceso que nos permite dar sentido a una — demokratia — a través de la otra — isonomia. Este enfoque también es útil para transponer meditaciones de la Antigüedad sobre la democracia a contextos contemporáneos, no porque las democracias antiguas y contemporáneas sean similares, sino porque esas meditaciones son partes constitutivas de las metáforas de la democracia con las que vivimos actualmente, y cuyas raíces se pueden ver en los atributos que Heródoto le asigna en III 80-82 y V 66-73.
Highlights
The isonomia Herodotus ascribes to Otanes will emerge as a notion complementary to that of democracy as a system of government derived from popular initiative and enforced by popular power, notwithstanding these very same attri butes being voiced by Otanes at the closure of his speech
We suggest two kinds of leading metaphors to guide this exam, each involving both isonomia and demokratia and their complementary distinctions
One general takeaway from this exam is that resorting to metaphors as categorical classification allows us differentiate isonomia from demokratia in
Summary
What does democracy imply when a man like Otanes puts it forward and a few moments later, after seeing himself unable to enforce his original proposition, re-configures it as a sort of «private democracy» exclusive for his private house? Would there be any significative difference between isonomia, the very word Herodotus employed to allegedly report Otanes’ original phrasing, and demokratia, the word he uses to refer to Cleisthenes’ new Athenian configuration? How similar or distinct was Otanes’ initiatives from Cleisthenes’, and with which consequences respectively for isonomia and demokratia? How does this perception impact our understanding about Hero dotus’ understanding of democracy? And how can it still help us understand and promote democratic-oriented practices?. Narrativity is the byproduct of participatory sense-making co-involving text and receivers, and an approach centered on it has never been applied to ancient historiographical texts so far2 This inquiry focuses on two clusters of metaphors around which Herodotus seems to have organized his perceptions about isonomia and demokratia: cognitive and pragmatic (discussed below). 165), we wish to evince cumulative interactions between both concepts and the way they allow us to make sense of one —demokratia— through the other —isonomia— This approach qualifies for helping us transpose ancient meditations upon democracy to contemporary contexts, not because ancient and contemporary democracies look similar, but because those meditations help form the democracy-metaphors we currently live by, whose roots one can see in the attributes Herodotus ascribed to it in passages like the ones to be discussed.
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