Isolation and exploitation of minority: Game theoretical analysis.

Dongryul Lee,Pilwon Kim,Alejandro Raul Hernandez Montoya

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0205241

Dongryul Lee, Pilwon Kim + Show 1 more

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https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0205241

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Abstract

We investigate various group-size distributions occurring in a situation where each group’s resource is exposed to appropriation by other groups. The amount of appropriation depends on the size difference between groups. Our work focuses on the cases where the entire community isolates a small group or even an individual to maximize its gain. While people’s basic motivation to form a group can be understood based on the group-size effect on multiplying a collective asset, sensitive factors that induce a asymmetric group distribution are the group efficiency and the ratio of secured assets to assets pending in a competition. We show that social rejection to a minor group may occur when the group efficiency is relatively low and their asset is severely exposed to possible appropriation.

Highlights

Minority denotes ostracized individuals or groups that are inferior to the rest of the population in terms of their power, numeric size, group features, group conditions and treatment [1, 2]
While most of economic analysis is based on competitive model and has focused on individual behavior inducing discrimination [6,7,8], there has been relatively few work on collective models dealing with collective group interactions
We investigate isolation of minorities and active social rejection to an individual occurring in group formation in game theoretical framework

Summary

Introduction

Minority denotes ostracized individuals or groups that are inferior to the rest of the population in terms of their power, numeric size, group features, group conditions and treatment [1, 2]. We assume that group i deprives group j of its exposed asset rC naj in proportion of their relative size difference (ni − nj)/N. We confirmed above that no group spontaneously forms with the small group-size effect, 0 α < 1 This is no more true with conflicts existing, since their smallness makes groups more vulnerable to appropriation. We assume that an individual can deviate from one group and get in another, only with the consent of the people in the group that he/she wants to join This implies that transfer can occur only when it leads to increase in payoffs of both the new comer and existing members. We are interested in searching Nash equilibriums of group distributions where no individual has incentive to change their groups any more

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