Islam in Afghan Conflicts and Politics

Abstract

The strategic use of religion plays an additive role in the ability of some Afghan political actors to legitimize their actions, mobilize support, undermine rivals, attract foreign aid, and control populations. Not all Afghan political actors can use religious language or sanction – only those who transcend divisions within a local, tribal, sectarian, ethnic, or national space and do not have a history of behavior considered “un-Islamic” can benefit from its advantages within that space, but not necessarily beyond it. These actors can aggressively leverage an Islamic agenda. Examples include several mujahideen organizations in the 1980s and the Taliban during their initial rise in 1994-2001 or during their insurgency against foreign occupation (2005–). Others, who do not have this kind of Islamic legitimacy, have to react to the strategic use of Islam by those who do. They may choose to adopt a strongly anti-Islamic agenda (e.g., the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan before 1985), make symbolic gestures to counter the delegitimization process (PDPA between 1985 and 1992), or be pressed to accommodate religious demands (Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani from 2004 until the present). In all cases, such actors are at a strong disadvantage in a very conservative and religious Muslim country. The strategic use of religion may not be necessary for Afghan political actors to be successful and it is certainly not sufficient for them to outperform their rivals. Other factors such as foreign aid, organizational development, and strategic sophistication can be more important; but the strategic use of religious language and symbols brings additional advantages in this traditional society and may have tipped the balance in a number of the brutal and closely contested conflicts that have plagued the country since 1979.