Is Transparent Belief “Intolerably Odd” ?

Abstract

The ascription of beliefs and other propositional attitudes, as Russell called them, raises more than one philosophical puzzle as to how language is being used. A certain complexity is implied for these puzzles by W. V. Quine's relatively recent observation that propositional attitude (PA) ascriptions can be construed in two distinct ways. In particular, Quine distinguishes between what he calls transparent and opaque belief, and treatments of belief that ignore this distinction do so at their own considerable risk. However, while Quine's observation per se may help towards more circumspect solutions, what he goes on to say about transparent belief, as I will urge, adds a bogus puzzle to the real ones that confront us. For Quine holds that transparent belief is so very odd that to countenance its ascription, though he thinks that we must, brings us to the edge of nonsense. Parenthetically, I might say that I am myself mystified by his proposal to prevent our slipping over. This proposal can be ignored, however, if it can be shown that transparent PA ascription is far from nonsense. Elsewhere, I will try to show as much, but all that this paper aspires to is a negative preliminary: the refutation of Quine's main argument for his opposite stand.