Is this “fascist” laughter? Notes on the ethics of humor

Abstract

AbstractThe traditional concern of the academic literature on the ethics of humor is to determine whether ethical considerations influence comic amusement or, in other words, judge the impact of ethics over aesthetics. For some, ethically questionable dimensions bear no implication for the effectiveness of jokes; for others, they do, but this group disagrees on whether ethical problems make jokes less or more funny. This article attempts an alternative approach and explores the occurrences in which the aesthetic reaction to humor reveals a more profound ethical commitment. It asks: What are the conditions under which laughter resulting from comic amusement reflects the moral stance of an individual? Or, more simply: Can one judge a person's character based on what this person is laughing at? The article starts by showing how humor can legitimately be taken as representative of the individual spirit, continues by identifying the subsection of humor that can offer an affirmative answer to the posed questions, highlights the power dynamics at play within this subsection of humor to justify its characterization as “fascist,” and concludes by offering guidance on identifying fascist laughter.