Is There an Independent Principle of Free Speech?

Abstract

The theory of the Free Speech Principle proposes that freedom of speech should be treated as an independent principle different from the general principle of freedom. This paper questions the validity of that proposition through examining the main assumptions of the Free Speech Principle. It finds that there is not an independent Principle of Free Speech for at least three reasons. (1) The philosophical foundation, moral justification, intrinsic value and legal limitations of free speech are not fundamentally different than those of freedom in general. (2) Perceptions on the utility of free speech alone may not be sufficient for assigning values, rules, limits and laws of free speech different from those of other forms of freedom. (3) It is unjustified, invalid and misleading to propose that free speech is or should be protected despite its harms. The paper concludes that freedom may not be divided into, nor may it be governed by different and separate principles based on its external forms, manifestations and applications.