Abstract
When a firm can make counteroffers to workers who have received outside wage offers, a winner's curse effect may exist. Raided firms do not make counteroffers to those whose value is less than the raider's wage offer, so the raider always earns negative profit when a raid is successful. In this paper, I demonstrate that, when a raided firm makes reassignment decisions in anticipation of outside wage offers, and there is at least an infinitesimal probability of exogenous turnover, a winner's curse will not occur when there are counteroffers, except possibly for workers at the lowest task assignment.
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