Is There a Problem in the Laboratory?

Alexander Nicolai Wendt

doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02443

Abstract

Problem-solving research in the field of psychology has been closely linked to laboratory investigations throughout its development. However, there is a questionable conceptual assumption underlying this commitment to the laboratory, namely the assumption that one can reduce all problem-solving behavior to a cognitive mechanism. Upon validating this assumption from a phenomenological standpoint, doubts about its foundations emerge. For when we consider the experiential conditions that characterize a problematic situation, we come to determine several phenomenal aspects that are not taken into account in this approach. A phenomenologically revised notion of the problem therefore demands a modification of the scope of the empirical research. First, this paper investigates the configuration of the laboratory as an arena of experience based on Lewin’s field theory. This investigation indicates instructions as a key component of the laboratory. Second, a phenomenological description proposes a novel understanding of the problem. In this part it is shown that it is wrong to presume that problematic situations can be evoked arbitrarily by instructions. Finally, further contemplations help outlining the empirical requirements for exhaustive research. They call for novel paradigms in empirical psychology, such as live streaming, which are more faithful to the phenomenology of problems.

Highlights

From an everyday point of view, problem-solving appears to be an entirely common occurrence
Whether selecting a menu for dinner or playing a friendly game of chess, participating in a marathon or working on a mathematical equation, the “goal-directedness” (Ohlsson, 2012) of these activities entails the idea of a solution – which is usually seen as the key feature of problems. This intuitive first look into everyday life favors agreeing with Popper’s notorious credo, “all life is problem-solving” (Popper, 1999)
Is the possibility of there being a solution or mere goal-directedness really sufficient to pose a problem in the first place? One cannot answer such a question from an everyday point of view alone, because this view is already linguistically committed to a vaguely holistic use of the word “problem.” Yet, everyday language indicates some excess of phenomenal meaning by talking about the “pressure” people feel in addressing a problem, the “trouble” caused by a problem, or the habit of “problematizing” something in order to defamiliarize common sense

Summary

Alexander Nicolai Wendt*

Reviewed by: David Alexej Tobinski, Universität Duisburg-Essen, Germany Casimiro Cabrera Abreu, Queen’s University, Canada. There is a questionable conceptual assumption underlying this commitment to the laboratory, namely the assumption that one can reduce all problem-solving behavior to a cognitive mechanism. Upon validating this assumption from a phenomenological standpoint, doubts about its foundations emerge. A phenomenological description proposes a novel understanding of the problem In this part it is shown that it is wrong to presume that problematic situations can be evoked arbitrarily by instructions. Further contemplations help outlining the empirical requirements for exhaustive research They call for novel paradigms in empirical psychology, such as live streaming, which are more faithful to the phenomenology of problems

INTRODUCTION

SITUATIONS IN THE LAB

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE PROBLEM

EMPIRICAL APPROACHES