Is there a place for psychology in the framework of rational choice theory?

Abstract

This paper aims to discuss psychological aspect of rational choice theory. The standard version of rational choice rests on a kind of psychology, since it operates with mental states. In standard davidsonian version it is claimed that we explain rational actions by stating proper desires and beliefs that caused the action. We will explore two challenges to the standard version that might be called cultural and naturalistic versions of rational choice. Satz and Ferejohn (1994) challenged standard version by stating that we can provide rational-choice explanations without relying too much on psychological assumptions. They argued in favor of moderate externalism, which should replace thin desire-belief model with thick structuralist conception. According to their model moderate externalism is compatible with realism about psychological states, while at the same time those states need not figure in the best rational choice explanations of actions. The focus of rational choice explanations therefore shifts to non-individual and non-psychological entities, such as firms in explaining economic behavior, parties in explaining functioning of democracy, etc. Although there is a place for psychological states within a moderate externalism, those states are not causally relevant. On Pettit?s account desires and beliefs figure in rational choice explanations merely as ?standby causes?. They explain resilience of certain behavior, not its actual cause. Quite contrary to standard rational choice theory, the programming model (Pettit, 2002) defines the neurophysiological level as more basic in explaining behavior. This means that higher-level psychological states are causally relevant for certain behavior only if certain lower-level neurophysiological producer obtains. In this paper standard rational choice theory will be defended against culturalist and naturalist criticism.