Abstract

In its over 25 years' history, the dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) has been touted as one of the most active and successful international adjudicatory systems in relation to other international dispute settlement fora. The process in the engagement of the system presents a tripartite structure consisting of consultation, panel and appellate stages, and the enforcement proceedings. The functions of these processes help to promote the trust and confidence of the member states in the WTO trade dispute settlement system. Now the Appellate Body (AB) is paralysed following the incapacitation and consequential suspension of the appellate function of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), because of the insufficient membership caused by the United States blockade on the appointment process of AB members. The paper discusses the trajectory of the WTO dispute settlement reform from the GATT regime, the root cause of the suspension of the Appellate Body, and the options available for the disputants in and outside the WTO system. It concludes that the system possesses policy defects if the attitude of a single state can render the AB non-functional and should be transformed when the appellate system is resuscitated.

Highlights

  • The implication is that, the panel and the Appellate Body (AB) reports must be adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to make them binding on the parties, by default, they are deemed biding as well as enforceable as such unless they are rejected by all the World Trade Organisation (WTO) member states by consensus, including the applicant

  • It has been noted that the Uruguay Round introduced the AB, a standing organ of the DSB composed of 7 members, from which a three-man-quorum panel will be composed to sit on an appellate review

  • A succinct statement of the position of this intervention is that the WTO dispute settlement system should be fixed with a functional Appellate Body for the reasons that all of WTO member states, including the United States (US), want it so153 and because the WTO through its agreements regulates as high as 98 per cent of the world trade volume, which has seen global merchandise exports grow from $54 billion in 1948 to over $20 trillion by 2018.154 This would mean that almost all the possible trade friction in the global trade

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Summary

December 2021

How to cite this article Umenze NS "Is the WTO Appellate Body in Limbo? The Roots of the Crisis in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body and the Available Routes Navigating the Quagmire" PER / PELJ 2021(24) - DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/17273781/2021/v24i0a8580

Introduction
The development of the WTO DSM from the GATT to the WTO regime
Coming about of the WTO Appellate System
The AB paralysis
65 See generally
70 WTO Annual Report for 2019-2020
The Appellate Body in a comma
No-appeal agreement prior to litigation
Alternatives to adjudication-based dispute resolution mechanism under the DSU
The proposed multi-party interim appeal arbitration
Concluding remarks
Findings
Literature
Full Text
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