Abstract
In this brief discussion piece I try to offer some considerations in favor of the so-called Simple Intention Theory of demonstratives, which is rejected by Gómez-Torrente. I try to show that the main argument offered against the Simple Intention Theory appears to be based on false data.
Highlights
The Kaplanian project of giving the character of demonstratives in terms of a description stating the necessary and sufficient conditions for their reference may be difficult to carry out, but philosophers usually believe it must be feasible2
I try to show that the main argument offered against the Simple Intention Theory appears to be based on false data
One of the simplest theories of demonstratives in the Kaplanian spirit is the so-called Simple Intention Theory. This theory attempts to state the character of demonstratives as follows: (SIT) The use of a demonstrative refers to an object o if and only if o is the thing the speaker intends to refer with her use of the demonstrative
Summary
The Kaplanian project of giving the character of demonstratives in terms of a description stating the necessary and sufficient conditions for their reference may be difficult to carry out, but philosophers usually believe it must be feasible2. I think this scenario does not describe a possible situation: the speaker cannot have both intentions suitably connected to her use of the demonstrative. With the object of my thought fixed relationally in this way, I use an expression to linguistically refer to the thing I am thinking about.
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