Is the premotor theory of attention essentially about pre-reflective intentionality?

Abstract

The Premotor Theory of Attention (PToA) is a prominent, albeit controversial, modern experimental account of attentional processes. According to the PToA, motor preparation is both necessary and sufficient for spatial attention. Explaining the cognitive process of attention in terms of sensori-motor machinery can be considered as embedded in the idea of embodied cognition. The vocabulary adopted by the PToA seems to bear a particular resemblance to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological notion of pre-reflective intentionality. He articulates it by means of directness towards the lived world, which is constituted in the spatial motility of the body-subject. In this epistemological state of affairs, we come up with two leading questions: (a) can the main tenets of PToA be essentially reconstructed in terms of the notion of pre-reflective intentionality and since the bodily motility is meant by the French phenomenologist to be at the root of all forms of intentionality, (b) can the PToA be expanded to account for all kinds of attention? In conclusion, we advocate a positive answer for the former question and point to serious doubts as to why it can rather not be retained regarding the latter.